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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a July 3, 2003 Order and Decree Quieting Title of Judge
Tyrone E. Medley of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Appeals from final decisions can be made as a matter of right to the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. The Notice of Appeal was filed with
the Utah Supreme Court on July 31, 2003. On September 15, 2003, and pursuant to
§ 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion
to transfer this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue for Review: Whether the trial court properly gave effect to the intent and
purpose of the previous Decree of Divorce in holding that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in
the prior marital home of the parties.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this issue is that the trial court's
interpretation of a contract be accorded no particular deference by the appellate court, but
that they are reviewed for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 WL 2251963 5
(Utah) (November 7, 2003); Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 778-79 (Utah 1992); Wade v.
Stangl 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).

RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW
Not applicable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in Lower Court
In a 1990 divorce, Plaintiff Allen's former spouse was awarded the family marital
residence located in Sandy, Utah (the "Sandy Property"). The Decree of Divorce (the
"Decree"), later recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder, awarded Sarah Satterfield
Allen ("Sarah") such property "as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by the
plaintiff...", but with a contingent right of reversion in favor of Plaintiff Allen in the event
Sarah moved from Salt Lake City at any time before their youngest child reached the age of
18.
Sarah subsequently mortgaged the Sandy Property on several occasions and ultimately
sold the Sandy Property in January 1999 to Defendant Thomas K. Hall. Thereafter, Sarah
resided in another home within the Salt Lake City area.
Before the youngest child reached the age of 18, Sarah moved out of state.
Plaintiff Allen seeks strict enforcement of the contingent reversionary interest in the
Sandy Property based upon the Decree provision intended to give him one-half the home's
equity in the event Sarah should move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah.
Plaintiff Allen alleges that he owns the Sandy Property free and clear of any mortgages or
interests of Defendants.
Plaintiff Allen filed this action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on May 18, 2000.
On May 20,2003, trial in this matter was held before the lower court, the Honorable
Tyrone E. Medley presiding.
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Following the trial, Judge Medley issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on June 109 2003. Judge Medley found that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy
Property due to the facts presented at trial. A copy of such Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law is attached as Addendum "A".
On July 3, 2003, Judge Medley entered his Order and Decree Quieting Title, ruling
that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy Property and that Defendant Hall owned the
same subject to the lien of Defendant Homecomings. A copy of such Order and Decree
Quieting Title is attached hereto as Addendum "B".
Plaintiff Allen filed a Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2003.

Statement of Facts
The facts of this case are virtually undisputed. However, the following facts are
relevant to the case before this Court:
1.

Plaintiff Allen and Sarah were divorced on May 17, 1990, pursuant to the

Decree entered in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Plaintiff Allen was the plaintiff in such case. [R. at 7, 530.]
2.

The written Decree was prepared by Plaintiff Allen's attorney. [R. at 7,531 -2

pp. 33.]
3.

Pursuant to the Decree, Sarah was awarded the Sandy Property located at

10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, "as her sole and separate property subject to no claim
by the plaintiff [David J. Allen]...." [R. at 9.] A copy of the Decree of Divorce is attached
as Addendum "C" hereto.
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4.

The Decree further provided in paragraph 10:

The defendant [Sarah] shall be responsible for all indebtedness and expenses
therefrom, holding the plaintiff [David J. Allen] harmless therefrom. The
plaintiff shall provide the defendant with a Quit-Claim Deed within 30 days
of the divorce becoming final, with said Quit-Claim Deed to contain the
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant maintaining current house
payments and not moving from the Salt lake City area before the last child
reaches age 18. If the defendant shall become more than 60 days in arrears in
the payments for said house, the plaintiff shall have the option of paying the
mortgage payment directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and sending
the difference, if any, to the defendant. If the defendant shall move more than
50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah, before the last child reaches age 18,
ownership of the marital residence shall revert to the plaintiff, who will then
sell the home and divide the proceeds equally with the defendant, and who
will be responsible for all indebtedness thereon until the house is sold. These
provisions are to ensure that the children have a suitable residence during their
minority, are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant if she shall
continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the form of all of the equity in
said home, and a detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of onehalf of the equity.
[R. at 9.]
5.

Thereafter, instead of quit-claiming his interest in the Sandy Property to Sarah

as required by the Decree, Plaintiff Allen quit-claimed his interest in the Sandy Property to
his mother, Norma Jean Allen, on February 15,1991. The intended purpose was to conceal
or protect his interest in the Sandy Property. [R. at 532, 564 p. 67.]
6.

Norma Jean Allen subsequently quit-claimed the Sandy Property back to

Plaintiff Allen. [R. at 532.]
7.

Finally, on October 18,1993, Plaintiff Allen quit-claimed the Sandy Property

to Sarah, as had been required by the Decree to occur within 30 days of the May 17, 1990,
Decree becoming final. [R. at 532, 564 p. 35.]
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8.

The Decree is silent about any restrictions upon, or effect of, Sarah's

subsequent refinancing or selling the Sandy Property. There is no requirement in the Decree
that Plaintiff Allen consent to any refinance or sale of the Sandy Property. [R. at 531.]
9.

Plaintiff Allen is employed in real estate development and is knowledgeable

of real estate matters [R. at 532, 564 pp. 54-5] and knew the Decree permitted Sarah to sell
or encumber the Sandy Property [R. at 532].
10.

Sarah refinanced the Sandy Property on several occasions subsequent to the

divorce. [R. at 533-4.]
11.

Plaintiff Allen was aware of such financings and even assisted in the financing

of one of the loans by executing an affidavit for the title company who handled the closing.
[R. at 534.]
12.,

Plaintiff Allen never obj ected to any financing of the Sandy Property by Sarah.

[R. at 537.]
13.

Plaintiff Allen knew ofthe refinancing actions of Sarah for approximately nine

years but took no action regarding the same until bringing this action. [R. at 537.]
14.

The Sandy Property was sold by Sarah to Defendant Hall on contract on

January 19, 1998, for the price of $146,000. [R. at 534.] To pay such price, Defendant Hall
agreed to pay the existing first and second mortgages encumbering the Sandy Property
(totalling approximately $139,000) and also paid Sarah $7,000. [R. at 534.]
15.

Sarah moved from the Sandy Property in January 1998 following a sale of the

property to Defendant Hall. Sarah then continued to reside in the Salt Lake City area in
another home.
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16.

Plaintiff Allen was aware of the purchase of the Sandy Property by Defendant

Hall at or about the time of the sale. [R. at 535.]
17.

Plaintiff Allen never objected to the sale of the Sandy Property to Defendant

Hall. [R. at 535.]
18.

In March of 1998, Sarah filed bankruptcy. [R. at 536.]

19.

The Bankruptcy Court subsequently determined that Sarah had no equity in the

Sandy Property and sales contract and released the Sandy Property from further Bankruptcy
Court control. [R. at 536.]
20.

Defendant Hall subsequently refinanced the Sandy Property with Defendant

Homecomings in the amount of $151,900, the proceeds of which repaid the two prior,
outstanding mortgages of Sarah. The refinance was closed on June 7, 1999. [R. at 536.]
21.

Plaintiff Allen filed a Petition to Modify the Decree in June 1999. The Petition

sought no modification of the provisions regarding the Sandy Property. [R. at 537.]
22.

Sarah moved from Utah on or about July 15, 1999, and the move was more

than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, Utah. [R. at 537.]
23.

An Order of Modification in the divorce matter was entered on September 12,

1999, and did not address any issues regarding the Sandy Property. [R. at 537.]
24.

On May 18, 2000, Plaintiff Allen brought this action in the Third Judicial

District Court seeking to enforce his claimed reversionary right to ownership of the Sandy
Property, subject to the requirement to subsequently sell the Sandy Property and then equally
divide the equity, if any, with Sarah. [R. at 1.]
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25.

Plaintiff Allen has not joined Sarah as a party to this action and has not herein

claimed that she is responsible for any monies to Plaintiff Allen. [R. at 564 p. 59.]
26.

On January 12, 2002, Plaintiff Allen executed a Stipulation to Modify the

Decree an additional time, and such Stipulation failed to address any issues regarding the
Sandy Property, including his contingent reversionary interest therein. [R. at 537-8.]
27.

On May 20, 2003, trial in this matter was held before the lower court, the

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding. [R. at 530.]
28.

Following the trial, Judge Medley issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law. Judge Medley found that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy Property due to
the facts presented at trial. A copy of such Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is
attached as Addendum "A".
29.

On July 3, 2003, Judge Medley issued his Order and Decree Quieting Title,

ruling that Defendant Hall owned the Sandy Property subject to the lien of Defendant
Homecomings. Judge Medley further ruled that Plaintiff Allen had no interest in the Sandy
Property. A copy of such Order and Decree Quieting Title is attached hereto as Addendum
"B".
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff Allen's claimed interest in the Sandy Property arises out of the provisions
of the 1990 Decree, drafted entirely by Plaintiff Allen's attorney. As a result, the Decree
should be interpreted against Plaintiff Allen in the event of a dispute over its terms.
The Decree does not restrict Sarah from mortgaging or selling the Sandy Property.
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Plaintiff Allen acquiesced in the post-divorce mortgaging of the Sandy Property by
Sarah, made no claim to an interest in the Sandy Property when the it was sold by Sarah,
failed to make any claim for his contingent reversionary interest in the Sandy Property in two
subsequent divorce modification proceedings, and thereby waived any claim to such interest.
There was no equity in the Sandy Property at the time the reversionary interest was allegedly
triggered.
The intent of the Decree should control the outcome of this matter, not a technical
reading of the recording statutes. The Decree intended to give Plaintiff Allen one-half of any
equity in the Sandy Property in the event Sarah moved from Salt Lake City. Unfortunately,
there was no equity in the Sandy Property when such event occurred in 1999.
Plaintiff Allen seeks a windfall which contravenes the purpose and intent of the
Decree. If Plaintiff Allen were to prevail, he would theoretically receive one-half of the
value of the Sandy Property sold by Sarah in 1999 for $146,000 inasmuch as Plaintiff Allen
would take title to the Sandy Property without being subject to Defendant Hall's ownership
or Defendant Homecoming's Trust Deed.

ARGUMENT
I.
The Decree Of Divorce Did Not Restrict
Post-Divorce Mortgaging Or Selling
Of The Sandv Property
The Decree, entered on May 17, 1990, between the parties failed to provide any
language which restricted Sarah from refinancing the Sandy Property.
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The Decree

specifically provided that Sarah was awarded the Sandy Property "as her sole and separate
property subject to no claim by the plaintiff. ..." Plaintiff Allen was obviously aware of
such fact. Sarah financed or refinanced the Sandy Property several times between May 17,
1990, and November 19, 1996. On at least one occasion, Plaintiff Allen assisted in the
refinance process by signing an affidavit for the title company handling the transaction.
There is no language in the Decree prohibiting Sarah from mortgaging or selling the
Sandy Property, nor indicating what effect such actions may have on Plaintiff Allen's
contingent reversionary interest in such property. Plaintiff Allen was experienced in real
estate matters. In the event Plaintiff Allen intended or desired that there be some restriction
regarding refinancing, he had the responsibility to incorporate within the Decree appropriate
language precluding such action or otherwise providing for the effect thereof on his
contingent reversionary interest.
In deciding how to interpret ambiguous or unclear terms of a contract, "we look to the
writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each contract provision...
in relation to all of the others with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."
Green River citing WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Svc. Corp., 54 P.3d 1139 (Utah
2002). "If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties'
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language and the
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. citing Cent. Fla. Invests., Inc. v.
Parkwest Assoc, 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002).
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"If the contract is found to be ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence
of the parties' intentions." Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 925 (Utah 2002),
citing Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
From the actions of Plaintiff Allen, it is obvious that he intended to allow Sarah the
right to mortgage the Sandy Property following the divorce, and likewise that such financing
would not be subordinate to his contingent reversionary right because:
1.

Plaintiff Allen was experienced in real estate matters;

2.

Plaintiff Allen's attorney drafted the Decree;

3.

The Decree does not prohibit such post-divorce financing;

4.

Plaintiff Allen was aware of such financings and even assisted Sarah in

obtaining one of the loans;
5.

Plaintiff Allen never objected to such post-divorce financing;

6.

Plaintiff Allen entered into two post-divorce Decree modifications without

raising any Sandy Property financing issues; and
7.

Any claim that Plaintiff Allen's contingent reversionary interest would have

priority over subsequent mortgages would, from a practical standpoint, clearly prohibit any
post-divorce dealings with the property by Sarah - something the Decree appears to allow.
The Decree was prepared by Plaintiff Allen's attorney. Any ambiguity therein must
be construed against the drafter - Plaintiff Allen. See Edwards & Daniels Architects, Inc.
v. Farmers' Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah courts
"interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation

'To

demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable' (citation
-10-

omitted).. . . [W]hether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Taylor v. Hansen,
958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1998), citing Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60
(Utah App. 1990). See also Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah
1995); Inter-west Const v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah 1996).
Consequently, Defendant Homecomings should not suffer damages as a result of
Plaintiff Allen's omission in the Decree. Defendant Homecomings paid off the first and
second mortgages against the Sandy Property incurred by Sarah. Defendant Homecomings'
Trust Deed should remain a valid lien against the Sandy Property and should be superior to
any claim of Plaintiff Allen.

IL
The Lower Court Properly Enforced The
Intent Of The Decree Of Divorce Over
A Technical Application Of The Recording Statute
Plaintiff Allen relies solely upon the constructive notice provisions of Utah's
recording statutes in his argument that his contingent reversionary interest in the Sandy
Property should have priority over any other interest in such property. To do so ignores the
purpose and intent of the Decree and would give Plaintiff Allen a windfall.
Plaintiff Allen claims that he takes title with no liens to Defendant Homecomings and
no interest to Defendant Hall. In other words, he seeks ownership of a home sold in 1999
for $146,000 free and clear (subject to the obligation to sell and give one-half of the equity
to Sarah). This would frustrate the purpose of the Decree, circumvent the intent of the
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divorce court's ruling, and give Plaintiff Allen a windfall. He would be unjustly enriched.
Plaintiff Allen's claims must be viewed with the intent and purpose of the Decree in mind.
As stated in the Decree, one of the purposes of the Sandy Property arrangement was
clearly "to ensure that the children [of the parties] have a suitable residence during their
minority." To effectuate such result, Sarah clearly needed the right to deal independently
with the Sandy Property, including the right to mortgage the same. Sarah was responsible
to make the mortgage payments on the Sandy Property.
In the event the Sandy Property was returned to Plaintiff Allen, the Decree
specifically provides that Plaintiff Allen would be responsible for the indebtedness owed on
such property at such time. Defendant Homecomings took a Trust Deed on the Sandy
Property on June 26,1999. Sarah moved from Utah on or about July 15,1999. If the Sandy
Property is determined to have reverted to Plaintiff Allen on July 15, 1999, Plaintiff Allen
accordingly became responsible for the indebtedness owed on the Sandy Property and, more
specifically, the indebtedness owed to Defendant Homecomings.
Otherwise, Plaintiff Allen would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Defendant
Homecomings.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc.,
12 P.3d 580 (Utah 2000), has provided that a claim for unjust enrichment must meet three
elements:
"(1) there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) the
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit; and (3) there must
be the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit
without payment of its value."
-12-

Defendant Homecomings paid off the first and second mortgages which were incurred
by Sarah. Plaintiff Allen clearly had knowledge of Defendant Homecomings' payment of
such indebtedness and will clearly appreciate its benefit if Plaintiff Allen took the Sandy
Property free and clear from any claim by Defendant Homecomings. It would clearly be
inequitable to allow Plaintiff Allen to claim the Sandy Property free and clear of any claim
by Defendant Homecomings.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Allen should be estopped from making such a claim due to his
drafting of the terms of the Decree, his awareness and even assistance in Sarah's post-divorce
mortgaging of the Sandy Properly and his failure to address the contingent reversionary
interest in the two post-divorce modification matters.
In the case ofState, Dept. of Human Services, ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676,
680 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
"The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel are: (1) an
admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement or act,
and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act."
Plaintiff Allen had numerous opportunities to (1) object to Sarah's post-divorce
mortgaging of the Sandy Property or (2) inform mortgage companies and Defendant Hall of
the provision within the Decree giving Plaintiff Allen a contingent reversionary interest in
the Sandy Property. Failure to do so in the circumstances of this case should estop Plaintiff
Allen from now claiming that others interests are void. The elements of estoppel having
been established within the present case, the interest of Defendant Homecomings is superior
to that of Plaintiff Allen under the doctrine of estoppel.
-13-

Finally, Plaintiff Allen's claims should be barred by the doctrine of laches. The Utah
Supreme Court in DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 845 (Utah 1995), has
stated, "[a] defendant may successfully assert this defense [laches] when a plaintiff seeking
equity unreasonably delays in bringing an action and this delay prejudices the defendant"
(citation omitted).
Plaintiff Allen became aware of his former spouse incurring debt on the Sandy
Property as early as November 1996. Plaintiff Allen would have had the opportunity from
November 1996 until June 1999 to address the issue of the incurred indebtedness with his
former spouse. Plaintiff Allen further became aware of the sale of the Sandy Property in
January 1998 but failed to take any action until May 2000. During the period between
January 1998 and May 2000, Defendant Homecomings paid off Sarah's first and second
mortgages on the Sandy Property. If Plaintiff Allen had commenced an action against Sarah
in November 1996 due to the increased indebtedness being taken against the Sandy Property,
and further if Plaintiff Allen had commenced an action against Defendant Hall shortly after
January 1998, Defendant Homecomings would not have paid off Sarah's first and second
mortgages on the Sandy Property and would not be involved in the present litigation.
Defendant Homecomings will be prejudiced if Plaintiff Allen is allowed to obtain the Sandy
Property free and clear from any claim by Defendant Homecomings.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Allen has had approximately seven years within which to
address the issues on the Sandy Property with his former spouse. In addition, during that
same period of time, Plaintiff Allen filed two petitions to modify Decree, during which
Plaintiff Allen could have addressed the indebtedness incurred against the Sandy Property
-14-

by Plaintiff Allen's former spouse. The indebtedness incurred against the Sandy Property
is a result of the actions of Sarah and Plaintiff Allen's failure to include appropriate language
within the Decree prohibiting Sarah from incurring additional indebtedness against the Sandy
Property. Accordingly, Plaintiff Allen should have addressed the issue within the divorce
action and sought damages against his former spouse for the additional debt taken against the
Sandy Property, if Plaintiff Allen felt entitlement to additional rights under the Decree.
Defendant Homecomings has done nothing more than to pay off the indebtedness incurred
by Plaintiff Allen's former spouse. If the Sandy Property had been returned to Plaintiff Allen
prior to Defendant Homecomings paying off the prior first and second mortgages, Plaintiff
Allen would have received the Sandy Property, subject to the first and second mortgages in
the sum of approximately $139,000 incurred by Sarah. Therefore, if Plaintiff Allen believed
his former spouse had inappropriately incurred debt against the Sandy Property, then he
should have sought damages under the divorce action.

III.
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act Issue Is Moot
Plaintiff Allen seeks to have this Court set aside the lower court's finding that the
Utah Occupying Claimants Act would apply, even if Plaintiff Allen's reversionary interest
were upheld to void the interest of Defendants Homecomings and Hall. The lower court
specifically found such ruling to be moot in light of the ruling quieting title in the name of
Defendant Hall. Although Defendant Homecomings is not directly affected by such
observation by the lower court, it agrees with the same. However, inasmuch as the lower
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court found that portion of the lower court's ruling to be moot in light of the circumstances,
Defendant Homecomings does not address such issue in this brief.

CONCLUSION
The Decree of Divorce did not prohibit Sarah from mortgaging or selling the Sandy
Property, nor give Plaintiff Allen priority over such transactions in the event his contingent
equity interest was ever triggered. The Decree of Divorce should be construed against
Plaintiff Allen, drafter of the same.
Plaintiff Allen seeks a windfall in contravention to the intent and purpose of the 1990
Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff Allen relies upon a technical reading of the recording statute
to elevate his claimed interest in the Sandy Property over the interests of Defendants Hall
and Homecomings.
The lower court properly enforced the intent and purpose of the Decree of Divorce
which was structured to give Plaintiff Allen a contingent interest in equity, if any existed, in
the Sandy Property in the event Sarah should move from Salt Lake City, Utah. No equity
existed in the Sandy Property when such event occurred.
The Utah Occupying Claimants Act was determined to be moot by the trial court in
light of its ruling and is not relevant to this appeal. Furthermore, such issue does not affect
Defendant Homecomings.
The lower court ruling was proper and should be upheld by this Court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January, 2004.
NELSON.

[STENSEN & HELSTEN

X

By:

Bruce J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Homecomings
Financial Network, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on 20th day of January, 2004, I caused to be hand
delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee Homecomings
Financial Network, Inc. to the following:
James G. Swensen, Jr., Esq.
Swensen & Andersen PLLC
136 South Main Street, Suite 318
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
with two (2) true and correct copies to be mailed, addressed as follows:
Thomas K. Hall
448 East Golden P h e a s ^
Draper, UT 84020 /
\

/ /U-_ J. / jfo^
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Addendum A
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID J. ALLEN, an individual,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs.

:

THOMAS K. HALL, an individual,
and HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL
NETWORK, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

CASE NO. 000904054

:
:

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for
trial on the 20th day of May, 2003, before the Honorable Tyrone E.
Medley; plaintiff appearing in person and by his attorney, James G.
Swensen, Jr.; defendant, Thomas K. Hall, appearing in person and by
his attorney, Kay M. Lewis; and defendant, Homecomings Financial
Network, Inc., appearing through its attorney, Matthew N. Olsen;
plaintiff and defendants having presented evidence and testimony to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That plaintiff, David J. Allen, and Sarah Satterfield

Allen were divorced on May 17, 1990, pursuant to a Decree of
Divorce entered in this Court.

2.

FINDINGS Sc CONCLUSIONS
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That pursuant to the Decree of Divorce entered on May 17,

1990, Sarah Satterfield Allen, the former spouse of plaintiff, was
awarded the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy,
Utah, "as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by the
plaintiff."

The Decree further provided:

The defendant shall be responsible for all indebtedness
and expenses therefrom, holding the plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
The plaintiff shall provide the defendant
with a Quit-Claim Deed within 30 days of the divorce
becoming final, with said Quit-Claim Deed to contain the
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant
maintaining current house payments and not moving from
the Salt Lake City area before the last child reaches age
18. If the defendant shall become more than 60 days in
arrears in the payments for said house, the plaintiff
shall have the option of paying the mortgage payment
directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and
sending the difference, if any, to the defendant. If the
defendant shall move more than 50 miles from Salt Lake
City, Utah, before the last child reaches age 18,
ownership of the marital residence shall revert to the
plaintiff, who will then sell the home and divide the
proceeds equally with the defendant, and who will be
responsible for all indebtedness thereon until the house
is sold.
These provisions are to ensure that the
children have a suitable residence during their minority,
are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant if
she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in
the form of all of the equity in said home, and a
detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of
one-half of the equity.
3.

That

the

Decree

of

Divorce

did

not

restrict

Sarah

Satterfield Allen from refinancing or selling the property.

Under

the Decree David Allen's consent is not necessary in order for
Sarah Allen to mortgage, refinance or sell the home.

That David
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Allen's attorney prepared the Decree and David Allen, employed in
real estate development, is knowledgeable of real estate matters
and knew the Decree permitted Sarah Allen to sell or encumber the
property, yet failed to take proper steps to correct this problem
or alternatively accepted the consequences resulting therefrom.
Plaintiff David Allen in fact testified that on numerous occasions
Sarah Allen threatened to sell the home because she was entitled to
do so under the Decree.
4.

That on about February 15, 1991, plaintiff, David J.

Allen, quit-claimed the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road,
Sandy, Utah, to his mother, Norma Jean Allen, instead of quitclaiming the property to Sarah Allen as required by the Decree.
Plaintiff's transfer of the property to his mother was intended to
conceal or protect his interest in that he testified that he could
have taken the property out of his mother's name at any time.
5.

That on or about October 25, 1993, Norma Jean Allen quit-

claimed the property back to the plaintiff, David J. Allen.
6.
S.

That plaintiff quit-claimed the property located at 10159

Flanders

Road,

Sandy,

Utah,

to

his

former

spouse,

Sarah

Satterfield Allen, on October 28, 1993.
7.

That Sarah Satterfield Allen recorded the Quit-Claim Deed

to the property on May 11, 1994.
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That on or about June 24, 1994, Sarah Satterfield Allen

refinanced the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy,
Utah, with CFC Mortgage Corporation, a California corporation, for
the sum of $75,227.
9.

That on or about July 14, 1994, Sarah Satterfield Allen

again refinanced the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road,
Sandy,

Utah

with

CFC

Mortgage

Corporation,

a

California

corporation, for the sum of $75,196.
10.

That on or about February 25, 1995, Sarah Satterfield

Allen took a second mortgage against the property located at 10159
S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with Pacific Rim Financial Services
for the sum of $7,000.
11.

That on or about July 28, 1995, Sarah Satterfield Allen

refinanced the second mortgage on the property located at 10159 S.
Flanders

Road,

Sandy,

Utah,

with

United

Companies

Lending

Corporation for the sum of $29,300.
12.

That on or about October 31, 1995, Sarah Satterfield

Allen refinanced the first and second

mortgages on the property

located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with UMG Funding
Group, Inc., for the sum of $109,600.
13.

That on or about April 11, 1996, Sarah Satterfield Allen

again refinanced the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road,
Sandy, Utah, with CTX Mortgage company for the sum of $120,000.
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That on or about November 19, 1996, Sarah Satterfield

Allen took a second mortgage on the property located at 10159 S.
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, with the Equi-Credit Corporation for
the sum of $21,400.
15.

That on or about November, 18, 1996, the plaintiff had

knowledge of Sarah Satterfield Allen taking a second mortgage on
the property and assisted Sarah Satterfield Allen by executing an
Affidavit for Academy Title Company.
16.

That on or about January 19, 1998, defendant Thomas K.

Hall purchased the subject property from Sarah Allen pursuant to a
residential purchase agreement executed between them.

That on or

about January 19, 1998, Sarah Allen quit-claimed the real property
located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah, to the defendant,
Thomas K. Hall.
17.

The agreement shows a sales price of $146,000. Hall paid

this price in the form of $7,000 cash directly to Sarah Allen and
assumption of the outstanding
balances of a total

first and second mortgages with

of approximately

$13 9,000.

The mortgage

payments were to be made by Hall directly to Sarah Allen who was to
forward them on to the appropriate mortgage company.
18.

At

the

time

defendant

Hall

purchased

the

home,

he

inquired of Sarah Allen whether there were outstanding liens or

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
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other encumbrances against the property and was told that there
were none.
19.

Within two days after purchasing the subject property and

taking possession, defendant Hall returned home to find plaintiff
David Allen in the house.

When he inquired why David Allen had

forcibly entered the home, plaintiff David Allen told Hall that he
had learned the house had been sold and that he was merely picking
up

some

children.

property

that

allegedly

belonged

to himself

and

his

David Allen then left Hall's house, making no comment or

giving any other indication to Hall that he, David Allen, still had
or claimed to have an interest in the house or that he had any
objection to the fact that Sarah Allen had sold the home.
20.

Defendant, Thomas K. Hall, reasonably believing that he

was the owner of the home because of the purchase agreement and the
deed

he

had

received

from

Sarah

Allen,

defendant

Hall

then

initiated and completed considerable work to clean up, improve and
remodel the home.

Defendant Hall expended $42,279 to improve the

home, an additional $10,000 for labor, plus real property taxes for
years 1998 through 2002 in the sum of $6,974.67.
21.

As he agreed to do when he purchased the home, Hall made

the first and second mortgage payments directly to defendant Sarah
Allen for several months. However, he then discovered that she was

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
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not forwarding these payments on as agreed and that the house was
in danger of foreclosure.
22.

In March of 1998, Sarah Allen filed bankruptcy which

forestalled the foreclosure of the home.
23.

Defendant Hall then sought and obtained financing from

Homecomings

Financial

Network,

Inc., to pay off

the

existing

mortgages in order to forestall the foreclosure, and obtained the
appropriate relief and consent to do so from both Sarah Allen and
the United States Bankruptcy Court.
24.

In her bankruptcy petition, Sarah Allen stated that the

value of the home was

$147,000; based on this valuation, the

property was released from the bankruptcy as having no equity for
the benefit of Sarah Allen's creditors.
25.

With the proceeds of the loan from Homecomings, defendant

Hall paid approximately $124,631.32 to Fleet Mortgage for the first
mortgage,
second

and approximately

mortgage

for

a

$22,33 6.69

total

of

to Equi-credit

$145,784.

That

for the

Homecomings

Financial Network, Inc., secured the loan with a Trust Deed that
was recorded on the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road,
Sandy, Utah, on June 26, 1999.
26.

When added to the $7,000 defendant Hall paid to Sarah

Allen for her equity at the time of the initial

transaction,

defendant Hall has paid $6,784 in excess of the purchase price due

ALLEN V. HALL
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to Sarah Allen's failure to forward the mortgage payments to the
lenders as agreed thus incurring significant late fees and interest
charges.
27.

Defendant Hall continued to reside in the home until a

few months ago when, because of this litigation, he rented it out
to third parties.
28.

Plaintiff David Allen knew of the refinancing by Sarah

Allen for approximately nine years yet did nothing until bringing
this lawsuit against defendant Hall.

Plaintiff David Allen, after

learning of the sale of the home to defendant Hall, again waited
for over two years before filing this lawsuit.
29.

That plaintiff David Allen filed a Petition to Modify the

Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1999, and failed to address any
issues regarding the property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road,
Sandy, Utah.
30.

That Sarah Satterfield Allen left the state of Utah on or

about July 15, 1999.
31.

That an Order of Modification was entered on September

23, 1999, and again failed to address any issues regarding the
property located at 10159 S. Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah.
32.

That the plaintiff executed a Stipulation to Modify the

Decree of Divorce on January 12, 2002, and that on January 12,

SVI
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2002, Sarah Satterfield Allen executed a Quit-Claim Deed in favor
of plaintiff as to the subject property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Sarah Allen and plaintiff David Allen were divorced on

May 17, 1990.

That the Decree of Divorce awarded Sarah Allen the

subject property as her sole and separate property subject to no
claim from David Allen, except as set forth in paragraph 10 of the
Decree.
2.

That

the

Decree

is

interpreted

established rules of contract interpretation.

according

to the

That the Decree is

ambiguous in that the indebtedness referenced in paragraph 10 can
be interpreted to mean the amount of indebtedness at the time of
entry of the Decree as asserted by plaintiff or the amount of
indebtedness at the time of the effective date of plaintiff's
reversionary interest.

The Court concludes that pursuant to the

Decree plaintiff is responsible for all indebtedness on the subject
property in the event the property was returned to plaintiff.
Plaintiff, with the assistance of counsel, drafted and negotiated
the Decree, therefore the Decree is construed against plaintiff.
That defendant, Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., maintains a
Trust Deed against the real property in the principal amount of
$148,291.33, which Trust Deed is superior to any claim of the
plaintiff. The Court cannot find that it was the intention of the

51*

FINDINGS Sc CONCLUSIONS
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Aliens to enter a Decree that can be interpreted to produce an
extraordinary
plaintiff

inequitable

free and

constructive

result

by

clear of all

notice

returning

debt

resulting

from

the property

allegations

to

despite the

plaintiff's

recorded

reversionary interest.
3.

The Decree negotiated and drafted by plaintiff in 1990

did not preclude Sarah Allen from mortgaging, refinancing, selling
or liquidating her equity in the subject property.

Sarah Allen

refinanced and mortgaged the subject property several times with
plaintiff's knowledge and at least on one occasion with his active
consent and participation therein.

The Decree was entered on May

1990 and for at least ten years plaintiff failed to protect and
clarify his interest in the property,
4.

Plaintiff Allen drafted and negotiated a Decree which,

with his years of experience in real estate development, had to
have

known was

unclear,

ambiguous

and potentially

harmful

to

innocent third parties who may purchase the property or take the
property as security for loans.

Plaintiff had full knowledge of

Sarah Allen's encumbering and refinancing of the property even
though

the

encumbrances

under

beneficial reversionary interest.

the

Decree

would

reduce

his

Plaintiff's failure to protect

this interest for ten years by not clarifying the Decree and his
conduct of participating in allowing Sarah Allen to refinance and

S3«\
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sell the property

to defendant Hall

is inconsistent with his

current claim that he is entitled to the property free and clear of
all claims and indebtedness.
5.

In January 1998, with plaintiff Allen's full knowledge

and apparent consent, Sarah Allen sold the subject property to
defendant Hall at its fair market value for approximately $146,000.
Defendant Hall purchased the property in good faith without actual
knowledge of plaintiff Allen's claimed interest except for the
constructive notice provided by David Allen's recorded interest.
Plaintiff Allen had full knowledge of the sale of the subject
property

to

defendant

Hall

yet

remained

silent

as

to

his

reversionary interest even though plaintiff Allen had sufficient
reason to believe defendant Hall was unaware of the beneficial
reversionary interest.
years

in

real

estate

Plaintiff had to have known based upon his
development

that

defendant

Hall

would

establish or assume mortgage obligations, property tax obligations
and make substantial improvements to the property as set forth
hereinbefore,

yet

plaintiff

Allen

remained

silent

and

waited

approximately two years after notice of the sale before initiating
this lawsuit and never taking any action in the divorce case to
clarify

his

interest,

all

to

the

detriment

of

defendants

Homecomings Financial and Hall and to the benefit of plaintiff.
The Court finds plaintiff's Allen's silence, delay and inactivity
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to be intentional and designed to enhance the value and equity of
the subject property to the detriment of defendants Homecomings
Financial and Hall.
circumstances

To quiet title in plaintiff Allen under these

free and clear from all claims and

asserted by defendants Homecoming

Financial

indebtedness

and Hall would be

unjust, inequitable and intolerable.
6.

Title to the subject property is quieted in defendant

Hall, subject to the financial claims of defendant Homecomings
Financial, free and clear from any claim or interest of plaintiff
Allen, whose claim is hereby disallowed based upon laches, estoppel
and unjust enrichment.
7.

The Court further finds that on or about July 15, 1999,

when Sarah Allen moved from the state of Utah, plaintiff Allen's
reversionary interest which was designed to return ownership to
plaintiff Allen for the sole purpose of selling and dividing equity
as set forth in paragraph 10 of the Decree is extinguished based
upon release of the property from Sarah Allen's bankruptcy upon the
grounds that the property was heavily encumbered with zero equity.
Therefore, any reversionary interests solely for the purpose of
dividing equity is nullified.
8.

Plaintiff's condition subsequent reversionary interest

which results in a forfeiture are not favored in the law and are
strictly construed.

Paragraph 10 of the Decree is ambiguous and

ALLEN V. HALL
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unclear and not clearly expressed making performance impossible
without substantial

inequitable harm to innocent third parties

therefore the interest is extinguished. Minneapolis Machine Co. v.
Hanson, 101 Minn. 260; 112 N.W. 217 (1907).
9.

But for having quieted title to the property in defendant

Thomas K. Hall's name subject to Homecomings Financial Network,
Inc. ' s financial interests, and free and clear from any interest of
plaintiff, David Allen, defendant Hall pursuant to Section 57-6-1,
Utah Occupying Claimants Act, would be entitled to be reimbursed
from

plaintiff,

David

$42,279.36, plus

labor

Allen,
in the

for

improvements

sum of

in

the

$10,000, plus

sum of

the

real

property taxes between 1998 and 2002 in the sum of $6,974.67. This
alternative claim is now moot.
10. Defendant Thomas K. Hall's claim to damages for excess
interest payments is denied.
11. Counsel for defendants Hall and Homecomings Financial are
instructed to submit an Order and Judgment

consistent with this

Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Dated this

^

day of June, 2^003.

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

]f;
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

following, this / ^

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

day of June, 2003:

James G. Swensen, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
136 S. Main, Suite 318
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Kay M. Lewis
Attorney for Defendant Hall
320 South 300 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Matthew N. 01sen
Attorneys for Defendant Homecomings Financial
8142 S. State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047

of

Law,

to

the

Addendum B
Order and Decree Quieting Title

,<A>

>jfci.»

T

>»rcl JuaC

' 'a/iir.-,

JUL . 5 * » , ,
Kay M. Lewis (Bar No. 1944)
JENSEN & LEWIS, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
and Third Party Plaintiff
Thomas K. Hall
320 South 300 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-4981
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID J. ALLEN, an individual,

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
iGMENTS
ir7 h> ^ /* ?
DATE

Plaintiff,
ORDER AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE

vs.
THOMAS K. HALL, an individual, and
HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL NETWORK,
INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. 00-090*4054
JUDGE MEDLEY

THOMAS K. HALL, an individual,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
SARAH SATTERFIELD ALLEN,
Third Party Defendant.

JD

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Tyron
E. Medley on May 20, 2003. Plaintiff appeared in person and by his attorney, James G. Swensen,
Jr. Defendant Thomas K. Hall appeared in person and by his attorney, Kay M. Lewis. Defendant

Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., appeared through its attorney, Matthew N. Olsen. Third
Party Defendant Sarah Satterfield Allen did not appear either in person or by counsel.
The court having reviewed the evidence and heard the testimony presented by the
parties, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters
its:
ORDER AND DECREE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce entered between the Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendant is ambiguous and, therefore, is construed against the Plaintiff, any claim to
ownership by the Plaintiff Allen arising from the Decree is extinguished, and any reversionary
interest solely for the purpose of dividing equity is nullified.
2. The claims of Plaintiff Allen to quiet title and for unjust enrichment to the
hereinafter described real property are denied.
3. Title to the following described real property situate in Salt Lake County, Utah,
is hereby quieted in favor of Thomas K. Hall, subject to the financial claims of Defendant
Homecomings Financial, and free and clear of any claims of the Plaintiff, whose claim is hereby
disallowed based upon laches, estoppel and unjust enrichment.
4. The claims of Defendant Hall under the Utah Occupying Claimants' Act (§57-61, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) for improvement, labor and real property taxes are
moot as title to the property is quieted in Defendant Hall.
5. The claim of Defendant Hall for damages for excess interest is denied.

-2-

6. The real property which is the subject of this order is more particularly
described as follows:
28-09-381-012
Lot 3, WHITE CITY NO. 41, according to the official plat thereof, as
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
DATED this

day of

N^fU^^y^

, 2003.

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, this
20th day of June, 2003, to:
James G. Swensen, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
136 South Main Street, Suite 318
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Matthew Olsen
Attorney for Defendants Homecomings
Financial Network, Inc.
8142 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Sarah Satterfield Allen, pro se
1300 Shepherd Street
Durham, North Carolina 27707

iTiULkdUx) M «
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n% 171990

Jane Allen, Bar #45
Attorney for plaintiff
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-1300

^Jmduid^^—

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT;
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID JOHN ALLEN,
plaintiff,

SARAH SATTERFIELD ALLEN,
defendant.

~

, - . .. \

)
)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

Civil No. 89490 3635

)

Judge John A. Rokich

This matter came on for hearing the 17th day of May, 1990.
The plaintiff v/as present with his attorney, Jane Allen. The
defendant was not present, having executed and filed with the court
an appearance, consent, and waiver in which she agreed that her**
default may be entered. Based upon the testimony of the plaintiff,
the file herein, good cause appearing therefor, and the court
having made and entered the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce, the same to

become final upon entry.
2.

The plaintiff has been a resident of Salt Lake County for

the three months immediately prior to the filing of this Complaint
for Divorce.
3.

The parties were married on

May 31, 1988 in Chatanooga,

Tennesee, and are now and have been since that time husband and
wife.

wit:

4.

The parties suffer from irreconcilable differences.

5.

There have been four children

born of this marriage, to

Ashley Angier, born January 24, 1981; Samuel David Allen,

born August 13, 1982; Peter Kale Allen, born October 12, 1982; and
William John, born August 25, 1985.
6*

The defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded

the care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties
subject to the plaintiff's

reasonable

and liberal rights of

visitation, upon reasonable notice to the defendant.
7.

The plaintiff shall pay child support to the defendant in

the amount of
children

$200.00 per

child,

$800.00 total

for the

four

until said child reaches age 18 or graduates from high

school with his or her class, whichever comes last.
8.

The defendant

shall be entitled

to mandatory

income

withholding relief should the plaintiff become more than 30 days
in arrears in his child support obligation.
9.

The plaintiff shall keep in force any policy of health

and accident insurance available through his employment or pay the
cost to provide insurance through the defendant's employment, for
the benefit

of

the minor

children

of the

parties, with

the

plaintiff to pay any non-routine medical, dental,^ optical, or
orthodontic expenses incurred by the minor children of the partie.s
which is not covered by insurance. The plaintiff shall bear the
cost of said insurance, which presently is $60.00 per month.
10.

The plaintiff is purchasing the house and lot located at

10159 Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah which shall be awarded to the
defendant as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by
the plaintiff except as set forth in this paragraph.

The defendant

shall be reponsible for all indebtedness and expenses therefrom,
holding

the plaintiff harmless therefrom-

The plaintiff

shall

provide the defendant with a quit-claim deed within 3 0 days of the
divorce becoming final, with said quit-claim deed to contain the
provisions that it is contingent upon the defendant maintaining
durrent house payments and not moving from the Salt Lake City area
before the last child reaches age 18.

If the defendant shall

become more than 60 days in arrears in the payments for said house,
the plaintiff shall have the option of paying the mortgage payment
directly to the lender in lieu of child support, and sending the
difference, if any, to the defendant.

If the defendant shall move

more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City Utah before the last child
reaches age 18, ownership of the marital residence shall revert to
the plaintiff, who will then sell the home and divide the proceeds
equally with the defendant, and who will be responsible for all
indebtedness thereon until the house is sold. These provisions are
to ensure that the children have a suitable residence during their
minority, and are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant
if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah in the form
of all of the equity in said home, and a detriment^if she shall
move, in the form of the loss of one-half of the equity.
11.

The personal property of the parties has been divided

equitably between them and each party shall retain the property
presently in his or her posession, with the party retaining an item

to be responsible for all indebtedness thereon.
12.

The plaintiff shall pay alimony to the defendant at the

rate of $800.00 per month beginning May 1, 1990 and continuing
until April 31, 1991, at which time it shall decrease to $400.00
per month.
in

the

If the defendant shall earn more than $12,000 per year

first

year

following

the

divorce, the

alimony

shall

immediately decrease to $400.00 per month. Said alimony shall
terminate upon the death of either party or by operation of law.
Child support and alimony payments are due in two equal payments
on the 1st and 15th of each month.
13.

The plaintiff shall retain the automobile presently in

his possession and the defendant shall retain the Volkswagen with
the

plaintiff

to

be

responsible

for

all

indebtedness

and

maintenance expenses, holding the defendant harmless therefrom,
for his automobile, and also the Volkswagen and he shall make all
car payments and maintain insurance coverage until such time as the
automobile is sold by the defendant or paid for in full, at which
time the plaintiff shall deliver title to said automobile to the
defendant and this obligation shall cease.

This obligation shall

terminate on the death of the defendant, or when paid in full
whichever comes first, and shall be considered alimony for tax
purposes.
14.

The plaintiff shall pay the debt for the Volkswagen. The

defendant shall pay all student loans in her name alone. Each party
shall be solely responsible for all debts incurred in his or her
own name after December, 1988, holding the other party harmless
therefrom.

The plaintiff knows of no unpaid marital debts.

15.

The plaintiff shall maintain a life insurance policy on

his life in the amount of $250,000, the proceeds of which shall be
payable into a trust of which all of the parties1 children are the
beneficiaries, which shall be maintained until the youngest child
reaches age 22 or graduates from college with his class, whichever
occurs later.
16.

The

defendant

shall

claim

all of the

children

as

dependents for income tax purposes*
17.

The plaintiff shall provide for the childrens1 college

educations if he is financially able in an amount not more than his
child support obligation,, on the condition that they maintain at
least a "B" average and attend school full time. Said support shall
end at age 22 or upon graduation from college with an undergraduate
degree, whichever comes first.
18.

The plaintiff has paid all attorneys's fees and costs

incurred in this action to date.
DATED this /J

day of

tr

^ ^ y ^

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

A

Judge John A. Rokici
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
^certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing decree of divorce to Sarah Satterfield Allen, 10159
Flanders Road, Sandy, Utah 84070, postage prepaid this (7 day of
May, 1990.

w
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